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THE PULL OF THE MAINSTREAM 
Martti Koskenniemi * 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW. By Theodor Meron. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989. Pp. xi, 
263. $55. 
I 
Ever since the Grotian tradition became little more than an object 
of ritualistic invocation in keynote speeches at conferences of learned 
societies, international lawyers have had difficulty accounting for rules 
of international law that do not emanate from the consent of the states 
against which they are applied. In fact, most modem lawyers have 
assumed that international law is not really binding unless it can be 
traced to an agreement or some other meeting of wills between two or 
more sovereign states. Once the idea of a natural law is discarded, it 
seems difficult to justify an obligation that is not voluntarily assumed. 
Simultaneously, however, it has been evident that if international 
law consisted only of formalized meetings of will called treaties, it· 
would not seem very important. Nor would it then contain many of 
those norms that most lawyers believe are crucial for the functioning 
of the present international system (such as sovereignty, noninterven-
tion, etc.). A thoughtful commentator once noted: "[O]ne can have a 
very fair idea of international law without having read a single treaty: 
and ... one cannot gain any very coherent idea of the essence of inter-
national law by reading treaties alone."1 
The matter is particularly important in regard to norms intended 
to safeguard basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. If the 
only states bound to respect such rights and freedoms are the states 
that have formally become parties to the relevant instruments - and 
even then only within the scope of their often compromised wordings 
and multiple reservations - then many important political values 
would seem to lack adequate protection. It is inherently difficult to 
accept the notion that states are legally bound not to engage in geno-
cide, for example, only if they have ratified and not formally de-
nounced the 1948 Genocide Convention. Some norms seem so basic, 
so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to argue that states 
are legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists an 
* Counsellor Qegal affairs), Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations, and mem-
ber of the Finnish Foreign Service since 1979. Diploma in Law 1983, Oxford University; Doctor 
of Laws 1989, Turku University, Finland. - Ed. 
1. C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1965). 
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agreement between them to that effect, rather than because, in the 
words of the International Court of Justice (!CJ), noncompliance 
would "shock[ ] the conscience of mankind"2 and be contrary to "ele-
mentary considerations of humanity."3 
Professor Theodor Meron's book, Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Norms as Customary Law, places itself squarely within this prob-
lem: To what extent are states bound by humanitarian or human 
rights norms regardless of treaties, by way of customary law? The 
subject, an important one, is situated in a theoretical mine field. 
Although it seems clear that not all international law can be based 
upon agreement, it seems much less clear what else, then, it may be 
founded upon. Basic questions arise about the legitimacy of applying 
norms that are based on something other than voluntarily concluded 
agreements. A Grotian lawyer would not, of course, perceive a great 
difficulty. He would simply say that some norms exist by force of nat-
ural reason or social necessity. Such an argument, however, is not 
open to a modern lawyer or court, much less an international court, 
established for the settlement of disputes between varying cultures, va-
rying traditions, and varying conceptions of reason and justice. Such 
conceptions seem to be historically and contextually conditioned, so 
that imposing them on a nonconsenting state seems both political and 
unjustifiable as such. 
It is, I believe, for this reason - the difficulty of justifying concep-
tions of natural justice in modern society - that lawyers have tended 
to relegate into "custom" all those important norms that cannot be 
supported by treaties. In this way, they might avoid arguing from an 
essentially naturalistic -and thus suspect - position. "Custom" may 
seem both less difficult to verify and more justifiable to apply than 
abstract maxims of international justice. 
Besides treaty and custom, the Statute of the ICJ in paragraph 1 of 
article 38 (the provision usually held to contain the authoritative state-
ment of the sources of international law) also lists the "general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations" as well as, in a secondary 
fashion, teachings of publicists and judicial precedent. 4 At first blush, 
2. Reservations to the Convention on the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion of May 28). 
3. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
4. Paragraph 1 of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determi-
nation of rules of law. 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1. 
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the category of "general principles" would seem a suitable candidate 
for arguing about human rights or principles of humanitarian law. 
But the ICJ, for one, seems never to have made express reference to 
general principles. For most modern lawyers, and the World Court, 
international law consists, for all practical purposes, of only two sorts 
of norms: treaty norms and custom. All nonwritten norms -
whatever their basis, character, or significance - are routinely treated 
as customary. As a result, as a judge at the ICJ has noted, much of 
what we tend to call custom "is not only not customary law: it does 
not even faintly resemble a customary law."5 
Professor Meron follows this strategy. Although he accepts the 
category of "general principles" as a valid way to argue about human 
rights and humanitarian norms, he does not use this argumentative 
tack. Nor does he examine whether, or to what extent, such norms 
might be valid as natural law. His reason for so doing is clearly stated: 
he wishes to "utilize irreproachable legal methods" to enhance "the 
credibility of the norms'' for which he argues (pp. 81, 246). The as-
sumption here is that to argue in terms of general principles or natural 
justice is to engage in a political debate and to fall victim to bias and 
subjectivism. Following his rationalistic credo, Meron hopes to base 
human rights and humanitarian norms on something more tangible, 
something that jurists can look at through a distinct {objective, scien-
tific) method and thus ground their conclusions in a more acceptable 
way - a way that would also better justify their application against 
nonconsenting states. 
The starting point - hoping to argue nontreaty-based human 
rights and humanitarian norms as custom - however, does not fare 
too well in Professor Meron's careful analysis of pertinent case law 
and juristic opinion. He accepts the orthodox "two-element theory" 
of custom (i.e., for custom to exist, there must be both material prac-
tice to that effect and the practice must have been motivated by a belief 
that it is required by law (p. 3)), yet case law contains little to actually 
support such a theory, although passages paying lip service to it are 
abundant. Thus, his analysis of the judgement by the ICJ in the Nica-
ragua case, 6 in which the Court inquired, inter a/ia, whether articles 1 
and 3 common to all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had 
"crystallized into" custom, concludes by noting the Court's "complete 
failure to inquire whether opinio juris and practice support the crystal-
lization of articles 1 and 3 into customary law" (p. 36). 
Meron's unwillingness to inquire into a nonwritten law which 
might not be "custom" in the sense of the two-element theory is sur-
5. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, TEACHING 
AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (B. Cheng ed. 1982). 
6. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
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prising. The results of his analysis of the pertinent ICJ practice would 
seem to compel him to abandon or at least completely revise the tradi-
tional view of custom. Should "custom" perhaps be thought of in 
terms of some deeper historical necessity, for example, as many nine-
teenth-century international jurists argued?7 But no such radical revi-
sion is proposed. Meron's analysis complies with the orthodox 
approach - however much Meron is led to conclude that legal prac-
tice does not support it. 
It often seems that Meron's analysis and criticism of the ICJ's 
method for "finding" customary law leaves little ground for Meron 
himself to stand on. Sometimes Meron not_es that his own "preferred 
indicators" for determining when a human rights norm is to be valid 
as custom would be whether it is repeated in instruments and con-
firmed in national practice (in particular, in national laws) (pp. 93-94). 
Yet, there is no study of national laws in the book. In another place, 
Professor Meron stresses that "Opinio Juris is thus critical for the 
transformation of treaties into general law" (p. 53; footnote omitted), 
although he does not explain how courts might ascertain the presence 
of this "subjective element" without making presumptions on the basis 
of material practice. Yet, he also holds that the ICJ has made "only 
perfunctory and conclusory references to the practice of states" (p. 42) 
and he argues that only "limited significance" is given to the two ele-
ments and that the burden of proof for establishing custom in the 
human rights field is lighter than usual (p. 113). Sometimes he throws 
the orthodox theory completely overboard by concluding that, for im-
portant human rights norms, "[t]he 'ought' merges with the 'is' " (p. 
42); that the "derivation of specific rules from general principles ... is 
an important process in the development of customary humanitarian 
law" (p. 68); and that "the central source for the rules [for internal 
armed conflicts] will be the principles of humanity" (p. 74). 
These results are clearly correct. And yet, they are also threaten-
ing by focusing attention away from "rigorous" tests of pedigree to 
uncertain and controversial moral principles. It is somewhat disap-
pointing that so much analysis seemed necessary when the conclusion 
would have been available from a number of important studies on the 
practice of the ICJ and its predecessor. 8 It appears to be the case that 
the Court has "instituted a system of decision-making in which the 
legal conclusion reached is determined by the application of rules of 
7. See, e.g., Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, in 1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERI-
ANA 1 (1923). 
8. See, e.g., c. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 264 (1964); M. 
S0RENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 108-11 (1946); Haggenmacher, La doc-
trine des deux elements du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la cour intemationale, 90 REVUE 
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (1986); Virally, The Sources of International 
Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 116, 133-35 (M. Seirensen ed. 1968). . 
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law largely treated as self-evident."9 Meron's book would have been a 
more important contribution to human rights law if, instead of arriv-
ing where most thoughtful scholars have arrived on the subject for the 
past forty years, it had attempted an analysis of what makes a norm 
binding even absent a basis in treaty, if not the practice and the opinio. 
But there is no analysis of the political right in the book, no "deriva-
tions" from general principles or from principles of humanity, and no 
attempt to take the Court's departures from orthodox custom 
seriously. 
Although Meron does not analyze the various general theories of 
international custom (and no such analysis is really needed), he does 
review the arguments used by lawyers seeking to make treaty-based 
human rights norms binding on nonparties. The four principal argu-
mentative strategies claim that a norm is binding for nonparties if (1) 
it can be deduced from the provisions - in particular articles 55 and 
56 - of the United Nations Charter; (2) it is supported by a general 
(even if perhaps not unanimous) consensus; (3) it has become a "gen-
eral principle of law" in the sense of article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ; or (4) it has been tacitly accepted by nonparties as well (pp. 81-
106). Of these, Meron concentrates on the last two, which he thinks 
are the most likely to succeed. 
The category of "general principles," it must be noted at the out-
set, does not signify for Professor Meron what is signified to the draft-
ers of the ICJ Statute - particularly Baron Descamps. 10 General 
principles are not natural or even quasi-natural principles but general-
izations from municipal jurisprudence (pp. 88-89). But one wonders 
whether this is really the secret of their apparent relevance. Given 
that it is practically impossible to collect representative data of such 
jurisprudence, and given that only a minority of countries apply a 
stare decisis system, the usefulness of this approach seems doubtful. 
For a continental lawyer - such as this author - using basically 
American and British cases to argue for general principles is a ques-
tionable strategy. It is true that analyzing American cases - as 
Meron has done - is a useful tool for illustrating the structure of 
typical argumentation in human rights as in other cases. But I would 
be very hesitant to imply that the arguments by U.S. courts in, for 
instance, the much-debated Filartiga v. Pena-Ira/a 11 and Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic 12 cases possess any formal authority in deter-
mining the obligations of other states. Perhaps this is not what Meron 
9. Kearney, Sources of Law and the International Court of Justice, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE 610, 653 (L. Gross ed. 1976). 
10. See ADVISORY CoMMITTEE OF JURISTS, PROCEs-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE COMMITTEE 293 (1920). 
11. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
12. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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implies. Maybe he merely intends to show the typical (natural!) way 
in which the relevant norms (prohibition of torture and terrorism) are 
applicable. But, in that case, he should have considered those argu-
ments on their merits, not merely described their use in U.S. courts. 
Yet the book contains no such discussion. One is left with the feeling 
that Meron's very discussion - informative though it is - is more 
intended to show American lawyers how to plead when pressing a 
human rights case in American courts than to reveal much about in-
ternational law. 
The other strategy recommended by Meron as an "effective means 
for expanding the universality of international human rights" (p. 89) 
- arguing on the basis of tacit acceptance ("acquiescence") - is a 
strategy much used in intemational litigation.13 Using it for the pur-
poses he intends, however, meets with the difficulties any consensual-
ism is bound to confront. First, it contains the unpleasant implication 
that people have human rights only so far as actually accepted by 
states. It thus leaves the door open for a state to come up with evi-
dence actually denying its intent to be bound by others' treaties. Sec-
ond, and relating to the first point, it meets with difficulties of proof. 
If a state denies that it has consented to a human rights norm embed-
ded in a treaty to which it has refrained from being a party, how can 
we justifiably claim to know which norms that state has consented to 
better than the state itself does? The very assumption that we could 
seems odd. It provides a justification for overruling a state's express 
report about its will - in this sense it is a Hobbesian argument which 
posits the arguer in the place of Leviathan. It also destroys the liberal 
justification for relying on consent - and the justification for basing 
social order on a popular vote - in the first place: Why do this if 
someone else (we) can know better? 
In fact, arguing from tacit consent tends to be a camouflage for 
arguing from a conception of justice, most frequently from the princi-
ple that legitimate expectations should not be ignored. It is not really 
- despite appearances - a consensual argument at all. 14 This is the 
lesson of the judgment by the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases, 15 in 
which the court held France bound by certain statements made by its 
president and foreign minister despite other evidence that France 
never intended to assume a legally enforceable obligation. This result, 
however, is not a conclusion about someone's consent, but an extrapo-
lation of what seems just or, as the Court here put it, in accordance 
13. Cf M. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 284-341 (1989). 
14. Cf c. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF PoLmCAL OBLIGATION: A CRmQUE OF LIBERAL 
THEORY 15-17, 81-98 (2d ed. 1985). 
15. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 {Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1974 
I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20). 
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with the good faith principle.16 Therefore, it is hardly consistent with 
the orthodox theory of customary law, nor, for that matter, with the 
assumptions of legal objectivity behind liberal legal theory. 
Throughout the book one has the impression that whenever Meron 
states that some humanitarian or human rights principle is a part of 
customary law, the conclusion does not really follow from the argu-
ments, but instead existed in Meron's head even as the arguments were 
chosen. This feeling is in no way diminished by the fact that he con-
tinually changes the types of arguments he puts forward to support his 
conclusions. Sometimes he relies quite openly on a shared intuition 
between the reader and himself. The feeling is, in other words, that 
Professor Meron has quite strong opinions about which norms should 
be included among those that are binding even beyond specific trea-
ties, 17 and that he uses whichever arguments are available to support 
them. 
This is intended less as a criticism than a point of reflection. Might 
it not be that the certainty we have of the illegality of genocide, or of 
torture, or of depriving ethnic wholes the right of self-determination, is 
by itself sufficient reason to include those norms in international law? 
What does it add to such certainty if we find, or do not find, a prece-
dent, a state, or the United Nations General Assembly, saying the 
same? Very little, I feel. 
My point is as follows: In his wish to look for "irreproachable 
legal methods" to argue for the validity of nontreaty norms, Professor 
Meron has tried to rely on the traditional two-element theory of cus-
tom - the material practice and the opinio juris. His hope was that 
these would provide a noncontroversial litmus test that would finally 
convince everyone of the certainty of his conclusions. As Meron him-
self shows, however, this test is in fact relatively useless. It is useless, 
first, because the interpretation of "state behavior" or "state will" is 
not an automatic operation but involves the choice and use of concep-
tual matrices that are controversial and that usually allow one to argue 
either way. But it is also, and more fundamentally, useless because we 
do not wish to condone anything that states may do or say, and be-
cause it is really our certainty that genocide or torture is illegal that 
allows us to understand state behavior and to accept or reject its legal 
message, not state behavior itself that allows us to understand that 
these practices are prohibited by law. It seems to me that if we are 
uncertain of the latter fact, then there is really little in this world we 
can feel confident about. 
16. Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 268. 
17. Meron's list includes the prohibition of torture and racial discrimination, and the mini-
mum guarantees for humane treatment found in article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See pp. 46-
47 (his list of customary standards in Geneva Convention No. IV); pp. 94-98 (his list of general 
human rights norms). 
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In other words, finding juristic evidence (a precedent, a habitual 
behavior, a legal doctrine) to support such a conclusion adds little or 
nothing to our reasons for adopting it. To the contrary, it contains the 
harmful implication that it is only because this evidence is available 
that we can justifiably reach our conclusion. It opens the door for 
disputing the conclusion by disputing the presence of the evidence, or 
for requiring the same evidence in support of some other equally com-
pelling conclusion, when that evidence might not be so readily 
available. 
It is, of course, true that people are uncertain about right and 
wrong. The past two hundred years since the Enlightenment and the 
victory of the principle of arbitrary value have done nothing to teach 
us about how to know these things or how to cope with our strong 
moral intuitions.18 But one should not pretend that this uncertainty 
will vanish if only one is methodologically "rigorous." If the develop-
ment of the human sciences has taught us anything during its short 
history, it is that the effort to replace our loss of faith in theories about 
the right and the good with an absolute faith in our ability to under-
stand human life as a matter of social "facts" has been a failure. We 
remain just as unable to derive norms from the facts of state behavior 
as Hume was. And we are just as compelled to admit that everything 
we know about norms which are embedded in such behavior is condi-
tioned by an anterior - though at least in some respects largely 
shared - criterion of what is right and good for human life. 
II 
There is little else to be said about Professor Meron's discussion in 
Parts I and II of the book dealing with the customary law character of 
humanitarian and human rights norms. The discussion is balanced 
and the conclusions are usually intuitively acceptable. They are not 
so, however, because Meron succeeds in showing how well they corre-
spond to state practice, but because they, for the most part, appear 
reasonable and coincide with our moral imagination. For example, he 
discusses at length whether a provision in a treaty allowing reserva-
tions - or not allowing them - is relevant in determining the cus-
tomary character of that provision. Meron concludes, correctly, that 
these facts may have some probative value although they remain unre-
liable as rules for determining whether the respective provision might 
be valid as custom (p. 24). The point I want to make here is that the 
contextual assessment that ascertains the customary character of a 
provision cannot be fitted within any rigid "method" for finding cus-
tom in every case. It is a practical matter (in the sense of being related 
to normative praxis) that requires making contested, political evalua-
18. Cf. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984). 
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tions. It is not a rule-determined activity but one which gives meaning 
to rules (namely rules concerning reservations, consent, and jus 
cogens) and which therefore remains external to them. 
Meron also discusses the transformation of treaties into custom 
with particular reference to norms enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. He considers, for exam-
ple, whether practice by treaty parties constitutes relevant "practice," 
the effect of occasional deviations and possible reactions to them, and 
the scope of the relevant practice by nonparties. But his framing of 
the problem is notoriously problematic. A treaty may be evidence of 
custom (in the sense that it shows the importance of a norm to its 
parties) or evidence of the absence of custom (otherwise we must re-
main puzzled about the need to conclude the treaty in the first 
place).19 Professor Meron is aware of these - and other - para-
doxes, but his discussion does little more than lay them in the open. 
At a significant place in his argument, he contends that "[b]oth schol-
arly and judicial sources have shown reluctance to reject conventional 
norms whose content merits customary law status as candidates for 
that status . . . " (p. 57). This, he adds, "may reflect the strength of 
moral claims" for their application (p. 57). Again, this seems quite 
correct but is simultaneously puzzling if one remembers Meron's insis-
tence on the "two-element" method. Again, one seems drawn into a 
contextual assessment of the political significance of the treaty. 
Consider, for example Professor Meron's account of how the 
United States determined which of the rules in Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Convention (which the United States has not ratified) had cus-
tomary law character. The determination, it seems, was "guided both 
by considerations of [the United States'] own military interests and by 
policy and value judgments" (p. 68). Meron should take this as an 
affirmation that such factors do indeed play a role in this determina-
tion, yet he does not. At least he should list this finding among the 
state practices he uses to draw consequences from. 
III 
Lawyers - and international lawyers are no exception - often 
assume that the core of law consists of norms enforced by sanctions. 
There may even be some doubt about whether norms alone, without 
some regime for enforcing them, can properly be called legal norms at 
all. As is well known, this point is frequently asserted to deny the 
19. Thus, in Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 INTL. 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 72-73 (1981), the Arbitrator regarded lump sum agreements whereby less 
than full compensation was paid as evidence of custom which did not provide for full compensa-
tion in nationalization cases. However, lump sum agreements were treated as conscious depar-
tures from a customary standard offull compensation by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
in Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 25 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 629, 633 (1986). 
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"legal" character of intersovereign law.20 
If international lawyers have had some trouble convincing critics 
about the legal character of their law in the absence of effective sanc-
tions, they have experienced even more difficulty when arguing for the 
"hard law" character of international human rights norms. Therefore, 
the third, and longest, part of Professor Meron's book - discussing 
the international responsibility of states for violations of human rights 
standards - seems of paramount importance for human rights law-
yers (pp. 136-245). If human rights are really connected with a regime 
of international accountability, then they might emerge from their as-
sociation with "soft" ethico-political principles onto the level of hard 
law. 
This part of Meron's book is divided into eleven sections, which 
deal with most of what are usually thought of as central issues in the 
international law of responsibility. Professor Meron discusses, inter 
alia, problems relating to attribution of responsibility (private acts/ 
state responsibility), the application of the domestic remedies rule with 
respect to citizens and foreigners, the relevance of the problematic dis-
tinction between obligations of conduct and of result, the usefulness of 
the notion of obligations erga omnes, the distinction between interna-
tional crimes and delicts, exceptions to the responsibility rule (state of 
necessity), and modalities for realizing responsibility (national vs. in-
ternational enforcement). 
Here, too, the discussion is balanced and methodologically "rigor-
ous" and one finds little substantive disagreement with Meron's con-
clusions. He argues that international human rights norms are hard 
law, just as any other international norms, being connected with an 
identical accountability regime. The main problem here relates to 
Meron's admission that "[d]ue to the scarcity of practice ... our dis-
cussion will frequently be largely theoretical" (p. 137). This admission 
detracts somewhat from Meron's wish to show that human rights 
norms are "hard law," enforceable- and actually enforced- by na-
tional and international courts and mechanisms. To speak of a regime 
may even seem somewhat grandiose in view of the virtual absence of 
relevant practice outside of specific treaties, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) and its American counterpart 
(1970) as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966). As Meron notes, a general regime exists nowhere apart 
from the drafts and reports of the International Law Commission, the 
United Nation's main body for the codification and progressive devel-
opment of international law. These drafts and reports are not classifia-
ble as custom by any classical test, yet, according to Meron, they still 
"give a useful indication of customary law" (p. 137). For all practical 
20. See, e.g .• F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 173 (1950). 
1956 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1946 
purposes, his discussion uses those materials as if they contained an 
authoritative statement of custom. 
The International Law Commission (ILC) has discussed interna-
tional responsibility for most of its forty-three-year existence. Its cur-
rent project, begun in 1969, contains a repository of valuable materials 
on the matter. These materials can - and should - be used in any 
discussion concerning the law of responsibility. But the fact that the 
materials are only drafts and reports, that the project itself is far from 
finished, and that it is the subject of much academic as well as diplo-
matic controversy shows that one is moving here among a host of 
uncertainties. 
This may explain why much, if not most, of Meron's discussion 
not dealing with the views of the ILC on particular matters concen-
trates on the application of human rights treaties by organs established 
in them. The lengthy, handbook-like section on "mapping recourse 
options" for addressing breaches (pp. 136-54) is almost exhaustively 
concerned with treaty-based remedies. These remedies are, of course, 
generally inapplicable to breaches of customary norms (unless the cus-
tomary norm is included or interpreted into the respective instru-
ment). In any case, the jurisdiction of the treaty bodies is based on the 
acceptance of their jurisdiction by the parties. Nevertheless, and de-
spite any doctrinal problems this may involve, the practice of these 
bodies does have relevance for the interpretation and application of 
general human rights norms as well. To this extent, Professor 
Meron's approach seems justified. One would, perhaps, have only 
hoped for a discussion of the basis on which such generalizations are 
made - particularly in view of the recognized under-utilization of the 
treaty mechanisms for state complaints, which seems to indicate that 
pleading human rights cases is not "business as usual" among states. 
Outside the practice of the European Convention, there are no 
cases in which a state has filed a complaint within a supervisory body 
under the relevant provisions of the political covenant, the racial dis-
crimination convention (1966), or the torture convention (1984). The 
complete nonuse of the state complaint procedure in these treaties, 
and the virtually complete absence of practice concerning interna-
tional accountability for human rights violations does make it prob-
lematic to argue that such accountability exists as matter of customary 
law - unless, of course, "custom" is understood as a modern code 
word for something politically compelling. 
Meron's discussion of imputability follows closely the work of the 
ILC in this field. He accepts the Commission's conclusion that both 
authorized as well as unauthorized acts by state organs create respon-
sibility (pp. 156-59). Though this is clearly correct as a matter of pol-
icy (it being otherwise virtually impossible to establish responsibility), 
it is doubtful whether many states will accept this conclusion - par-
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ticularly because he also concludes that states are directly responsible 
for acts of even minor officials (pp. 158-60). The latter point is af-
firmed by a large jurisprudence concerning acquiescence or estoppel, 
for instance, in which the acts, statements, or silence by minor officials 
have sufficed to bind the state.21 Indeed, were this otherwise, many of 
those whose rights are constantly violated by officials in the regular 
police force, for instance, would have no remedy. The combined con-
clusion - that states are responsible even for nonauthorized acts of 
minor officials - though evidently tempered by the exhaustion-of-lo-
cal-remedies rule is perhaps inevitable if one wishes to have an effec-
tive accountability system for violations of human rights. Still, one 
wonders whether such a principle can in any near future become any-
thing close to effective reality. 
Meron shares the classical view that responsibility in relation to 
acts of private persons is connected to the state's duty of care (due 
diligence) (p. 171). Responsibility is triggered if the state failed to take 
preventive measures. What such measures might be is determined by 
a "reasonable person" standard and necessarily varies from case to 
case and probably also from country to country.22 That there is some-
thing of a double standard favoring economically worse-off countries -
seems today quite clear. 23 The broad standard set down by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in the Veldsquez-Rodrfguez case24 
is probably close to the customary one, as noted by Meron. However, 
it is uncertain to what extent the jurisprudence of the European Court 
can be argued to support a customary standard. Here the European 
Court has repeatedly noted that states that are parties to the European 
Convention must legislate to give effect to its provisions. It does not 
seem possible to draw the analogy that states should also legislate to 
give effect to the uncertain and varying customary standard of due 
diligence. 
One might be prompted to ask, however, whether "due diligence" 
is a proper concept within which to grasp the evolving law of state 
responsibility at all. It bears a relationship to fault liability which is 
today widely criticized. The construction of the due care standard 
may often take place with little or no concern to whether state organs 
actually knew about a violation or had any chance of preventing it. 
21. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 l.C.J. 6, 25 (June 15); 
Cahier, Le comportement des etats comme source de droits et d'obligations, in RECUEIL D' 
ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 237 (1968). 
22. Cf Affaire des biens Britanniques_au Maroc Espagnol, (U.K. v. Spain), 2 R. Intl. Arb. 
Awards 615, 644 (1925). 
23. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International Law and of the International 
Legal System in the Circumstances of Today in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 1873-1973: EVOLUTION 
ET PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 198, 232 (1973); G. DE LACHARRIERE, LA POLl-
TIQUE JURIDIQUE EXTERIEURE 63 (1983). 
24. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 28 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 291 (Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, July 29, 1988) (1989). 
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The presumption of knowledge, based on territorial control - as con-
structed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case,25 for example - comes 
very close to an objective responsibility which is triggered by many 
considerations, among which subjective "fault" in some agent may be 
only a minor concern. As is clear to anyone having read the state-
ments by state representatives at the Sixth Committee of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly when it undertakes its annual discussion of the ILC 
topic "Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law" - a topic introduced in 1980 and discussed each 
autumn since - no-fault liability (notwithstanding terminology and 
the somewhat painful attempts to distinguish between "liability" and 
"responsibility" in international law) has never come close to receiving 
the consent of states. But consent, too, may be a relatively minor mat-
ter here. 
In fact, Meron comes close to adopting this view in his discussion 
of the relationship of "obligations of means" and "obligations of re-
sult" (pp. 182-88). He concludes that most human rights obligations 
are, or can be conceived of as, obligations of result (pp. 184, 188). 
Clearly, for the reality of those obligations, this is the only acceptable 
conclusion - though many would not accept it. 26 But it also brings in 
a nonfault-related standard and it renders largely superfluous any in-
quiry into whether anyone has acted with due diligence. It may be in 
order not to impose a pure no-fault standard on states that Meron still 
contends that "[ o ]bligations of means and obligations of result do not 
compete with, but complement, one another" (p. 184). Such a "com-
bination" might leave it open to argue in terms of due diligence after 
all, and thus escape from the consequence, so hard to accept by states, 
that they might be responsible for some act or event which they had 
no practical means of preventing. 
There is virtually no discussion of the customary status or respon-
sibility attached to economic, social, and cultural rights in the book. 
While one can appreciate the difficulties that such a discussion would 
create, reference to the problem might still have been appropriate, at 
least in the present context. It seems that a state's obligations relating 
to economic, social, and cultural rights - whatever their basis - can-
not easily be construed in terms of obligations of result. As often ob-
served, these rights are "programmatory" in some way that is difficult 
to define precisely but which clearly implies that the state has an obli-
gation to act, instead of an obligation to achieve a result. 
The discussion concerning the highly problematic conceptions of 
norms erga omnes brings in very little that would alleviate the intuitive 
feeling that what is at issue here is simply a political evaluation of the 
importance of some norms (or compliance with them) vis-a-vis others. 
25. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18-22 (Apr. 9). 
26. See, e.g., P. REUTER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 37 (5th ed. 1976). 
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(The same can be said of any attempt to distinguish between interna-
tional crimes and other, "ordinary" offenses.) As Meron correctly 
notes (p. 210), the distinction, as it appears in ILC drafts, is based on 
the (naturalistic) assumption that such crimes could be distinguished 
by their content. This leaves us with very little in the event of inevita-
ble disagreement about such content. Making a preference between 
two assumptions about the intrinsically heinous character of some act 
is inevitably a political choice. It is uncertain whether the results of 
that choice, if made, for instance, through a majority decision at the 
United Nations, would be very appealing to human rights lawyers. 
Meron's discussion of erga omnes norms takes up the (highly in-
conclusive) practice of the International Court of Justice in this re-
spect. He notes that the Court's distinction in the Barcelona Traction 
case,27 between "basic rights of the human person" and "ordinary" 
human rights norms is both "conceptually difficult" and "politically 
contentious" (p. 192). Referring to the U.S. Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law 28 as well as to draft article 5 of the Second Part of the 
ILC draft on state responsibility (p. 198) (which establishes the law of 
human rights as an "objective regime," extending the definition of "in-
jured states" in cases of human rights violations to include all states), 
he concludes that all relevant human rights norms should be seen as 
norms which are valid erga omnes - i.e., owed not to any particular 
state but to the international community as a whole. As a result, he 
asserts, such norms should be capable of being invoked by any state 
regardless of the usual jurisdictional rule that permits only a state 
against which or against whose national a violation has taken place to 
appear as plaintiff (pp. 196-99). 
It is difficult to imagine another conclusion on this matter that 
would be more morally compelling and further removed from the real-
ities of international life than this. It is, to say the least, quite impossi-
ble to justify such a view by reference to any international custom - if 
by "custom" one means something even remotely connected with an 
opinio juris plus generally conforming practice. States simply do not, 
in any manner which could be termed "customary," take up violations 
of human rights in other countries. Neither has judicial practice in 
any way formally overturned the dictum of the ICJ in the South West 
Africa cases, according to which locus standi is not constituted by the 
fact that all states have an interest in "humanitarian matters."29 
Though Meron does argue that "international practice" supports his 
conclusion (p. 199), he does not mention even one incident of state 
practice to this effect. The only "practice" he cites is the relevant ILC 
27. Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5). 
28. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 703 (1987). 
29. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 4, 34 (July 18). 
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draft. Perhaps for this reason, Meron retreats somewhat from his con-
clusion by noting that "customary law" is "not yet settled" on 
whether the right to take up violations wherever and against whom-
ever they might take place is restricted only to gross and systematic 
violations (p. 199). One is left wondering what type of evidence would 
go to settle the matter. Two facts seem pertinent. On the one hand, 
states do not grant each other the right to complain to judicial bodies 
about domestic human rights violations regardless of the nationality of 
the victims. On the other hand, they do make political protests every 
now and then, and these are made selectively, based on such factors as 
political alliances and controversies, inclinations of domestic audi-
ences, and the like. 
It would be difficult to accept that states could not criticize or take 
up in international organs the plight of people struggling against re-
peated human rights violations, regardless of considerations of nation-
ality or geography. The practice of UN organs, for example, has 
witnessed a marked reduction in the use of the reservation of matters 
on "domestic jurisdiction" in article 2(7) of the UN Charter.30 But it 
is one thing to note and applaud this development and another to ar-
gue that states have generally the right to ask for judicial determina-
tion of the conformity of a practice in some state with a customary 
standard of human rights. If there existed consensus about a basic 
customary standard, this suggestion would perhaps not seem too ob-
jectionable. In view of the extreme variations of political culture, and 
economic and technological capacity, however, as well as the range of 
plausible interpretations about the content and application of any po-
tential basic standard, my fear is that such actio popularis would sim-
ply mean an attempt to enforce judicially a set of Western values. I 
have little doubt that strong ethico-political necessities require interna-
tional lawyers, and others, to condemn oppressive social practices, 
wherever they might occur. Such practices should be taken into inter-
national fora, discussed there, and hopefully eliminated sooner rather 
than later. But I would hesitate to affirm a right of actio popularis, 
with all that this implies about the finality and enforcement of the 
judgment, the creation of a legal culture of pleading human rights in 
other countries, and other issues. Such an attempt at a shortcut to a 
world state would too easily become an apology for imperialism. 
Similar problems arise in Professor Meron's discussion of the state 
of necessity and other causes for departing from the assumed custom-
ary standard. On the one hand, there exists some practice under the 
political covenant on this matter, but it is doubtful whether this prac-
tice may be generalized as customary. On the other hand, any accept-
able conclusion should provide for a set of core rights - however they 
30. For a detailed analysis, see M. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OP THE UNITED 
NATIONS (1982); M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION (1958). 
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are characterized - from which states may not derogate. What these 
latter norms might be raises the issue of jus cogens, a Latin code 
phrase for making the political distinction between important and less 
important rights. Meron does not discuss the problem of how (i.e., by 
what "method") to recognize jus cogens. But the expressions he uses 
("categorical rules," "decisive importance of certain norms and val-
ues" (pp. 221, 222)) are far removed from any assumption that these 
norms might be recognizable by the orthodox twin criterion of cus-
tom. The point is that this is a matter of political value: if you and I 
believe something is so important t\1at it can in no circumstance be 
derogated, then surely this conviction is deeper and more forceful than 
any conviction about legal validity created by any formal test, and we 
will feel fully justified in enforcing it as law (if that is the sensible way 
to enforce it). 
IV 
Professor Meron's work is a solid piece of writing within the main-
stream of international legal scholarship. He has taken up an issue 
which has surprisingly long been neglected by publicists, and he ar-
rives at substantively consoling conclusions: Indeed, some human 
rights and humanitarian norms may be argued as custom; indeed, 
these norms may be linked with a regime of responsibility for viola-
tions of the respective rights. The conclusions in each specific problem 
area are just as unsurprising in their final vindication of liberal intu-
itions. Indeed, which rights are customary is less a matter of formal 
tests of legal validity than a deference to their ethico-political impor-
tance; indeed, "elementary considerations of humanity" and "basic 
rights of the human person" receive legal protection regardless of 
whether lawyers come up with any number of precedents to support 
them; indeed, the more shocking the violation, the more open is the 
law for allowing responsibility to be triggered. Would any other con-
clusion have been acceptable, or possible? 
Throughout the book, Professor Meron stresses the importance of 
backing his conclusions with "irreproachable legal methods" (p. 81). 
He stresses the need for "greater analytical rigour on the part of 
human rights lawyers" (p. 247). His concern is, obviously, the relative 
exclusion of human rights specialists from the center of international 
legal debate - an exclusion grounded in what for the mainstream ana-
lytical jurists has appeared to be their uncritical enthusiasm over cer-
tain ethico-political principles of doubtful juristic value and their 
sloppiness in the face of orthodox rule-identification criteria.31 
31. A similar concern has been expressed by some political theorists who have wished to 
develop a more analytical (le., substantively empty) approach to current international human 
rights discourse. Especially relevant is J. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (1989). 
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Clearly, Meron has succeeded in showing that human rights can be 
argued just as technically as maritime delimitation. One may ask, 
however, whether this is not in some way a mixed blessing. For it may 
be argued that the justifying rhetoric of the mainstream is in disarray: 
positivism is no longer credible, naturalism has long been a closed op-
tion, and the different policy-science approaches have, if taken seri-
ously, failed to demonstrate what is specifically "legal in them," while 
their popular versions appear to be thinly disguised rhetoric aimed at 
furthering political interests. By becoming more mainstream, human 
rights lawyers may gain in academic or diplomatic prestige. But they 
will also face the danger of losing their critical teeth and finding them-
selves discussing analytic distinctions whose one social function is the 
legitimation of oppressive practices through the strategy of the excep-
tion: once you define a right, you delimit it. And once you delimit it, 
you offer a formally valid argument for someone to deny that right. 
Here is a final paradox: late-modern legal, social, and linguistic 
theory has taught us that rules, whether extracted from behavior or 
texts, are of necessity indeterminate. Thinking of human rights in 
terms of legal rules will extend indeterminacy into those rights as well. 
The secularization of human rights rhetoric involved in its becoming 
mainstream, then, may not be the best way to protect human rights. 
By remaining in the periphery, in the field of largely subconscious, 
private, moral-religious experience that defies technical articulation, 
human rights may be more able to retain their constraining hold on 
the way most people, and by extension most states, behave. 
